Combatting SLAPPs: Absolutism Is Not the Answer by Conkle, Daniel O.
Federal Communications Law
Journal
Volume 49 | Issue 3 Article 9
4-1997
Combatting SLAPPs: Absolutism Is Not the
Answer
Daniel O. Conkle
Indiana University Maurer School of Law, conkle@indiana.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law
School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Federal Communications Law Journal by an authorized
administrator of Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information,
please contact wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Conkle, Daniel O. (1997) "Combatting SLAPPs: Absolutism Is Not the Answer," Federal Communications Law Journal: Vol. 49: Iss. 3,
Article 9.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/fclj/vol49/iss3/9
BOOK REVIEW
Combatting SLAPPs: Absolutism Is
Not the Answer
SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out, by George
W. Pring and Penelope Canan, Temple Universi-
ty Press, 1996, 279 pages.
Reviewed by Daniel 0. Conlde*
Professors George W. Pring and Penelope Canan have spent more than
a decade studying the phenomenon they call "SLAPPs": "Strategic
Lawsuits Against Public Participation."' Advocates as well as scholars,
Pring and Canan now have published what they describe as "a 'Handbook
on SLAPPs' for Americans who do not want to be cut off from public
issues or from those who govern them."2 "A new breed of lawsuits is
stalking America," the authors write.3 "Like some new strain of virus,
these court cases carry dire consequences for individuals, communities, and
the body politic."4
Pring and Canan present research that is extremely interesting and
important, and they advance a convincing argument that SLAPPs have
chilled political speech and impaired our system of democratic governance.
They propose solutions that are bold and powerful. Unfortunately, however,
* Professor of Law and Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, Indiana Universi-
ty-Bloomington.
1. GEORGE W. PPJNG & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPs: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING
OuT x (1996). Professors at the University of Denver, George W. Pring is an academic
lawyer and Penelope Canan a sociologist. In 1984, the authors initiated the University of
Denver's Political Litigation Project, through which they have conducted interdisciplinary
research relating to SLAPPs. Id. at x, 2. Pring and Canan themselves coined the "SLAPPs"
terminology, but it is now used widely in the courts and elsewhere. Id. at 3.
2. Id. at xii. The authors previously had published various book chapters and articles
relating to their research. For a list of citations, see id. at 223 n.2
3. Id. at 1.
4. Id.
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their solutions are bold and powerful to a fault. Thus, in dealing single-
mindedly with the problems caused by SLAPPs, the authors give inadequate
attention to the complexity of the phenomenon they are studying and
inadequate weight to competing considerations.
SLAPPs are lawsuits that are filed against individuals or groups in
response to political activities such as "circulating a petition, writing a letter
to the editor, testifying at a public hearing, reporting violations of law,
lobbying for legislation, peacefully demonstrating, or otherwise attempting
to influence government action."5 A majority of these lawsuits claim libel
or slander;6 others rely on other legal theories, such as business interfer-
ence.7 According to Pring and Canan, however, SLAPPs use these
conventional legal categories "to mask their real purpose."8 Regardless of
their particular legal theories, the authors write, we should treat these
lawsuits together, as SLAPPs, because all of them are "triggered by
defendants' attempts to influence government action--the exact activity
covered by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment." 9
Elaborating, Pring and Canan offer an expansive definition of SLAPPs.
Thus, SLAPPs are civil complaints or counterclaims filed against nongov-
ernmental individuals or organizations on the basis of "communications
made to influence a governmental action or outcome ... on ... a
substantive issue of some public interest or social significance."'" Under
this definition, "the parties' subjective motives or good faith" is irrelevant,
as is "who was right or wrong on the merits.""
So defined, SLAPPs not only rely on differing legal theories, but they
also arise in diverse factual contexts. Many are designed primarily to
advance commercial interests. Real estate developers, for example, bring
suits against citizens who have attempted to block proposed developments,
and businesses sue environmental or consumer activists who have lobbied
for governmental action. Other SLAPPs, by contrast, are brought by
service-oriented organizations, including nonprofit organizations, against
citizens who have frustrated their efforts to establish group homes in
particular neighborhoods. Still others are brought by individual plaintiffs,
5. Id. at 1.
6. Id. at 217.
7. See id. at 150-51, 217.
8. Id. at 150.
9. Id. at 3.
10. Id. at 8-9.
11. Id. at 8. As a result, the authors' "SLAPP" terminology ("Strategic Lawsuits
Against Public Participation")-or at least the "S" in "SLAPP"---may be misleading. In
particular, there is nothing in the authors' definition that requires that SLAPPs be filed for
"strategic" reasons.
[Vol 49
COMBATTING SLAPPS
such as police officers, public teachers, and other public servants, who
claim that citizens have unfairly criticized their official performance.
Utilizing their extensive research, Pring and Canan devote approxi-
mately half of their book to a detailed description of particular SLAPPs-
and their adverse effects on those involved-in these various factual
settings. 2 The authors rely not only on reported judicial opinions, but
also on in-depth interviews with nearly a thousand individuals. 3 The
result is a colorful and lively account of the real-world impact of these
lawsuits.
Based on their research, Pring and Canan "conservatively estimate that
thousands of SLAPPs have been filed in the last two decades, tens of
thousands of Americans have been SLAPPed, and still more have been
muted or silenced by the threat."'4 Notably, the authors conclude that
"filers of SLAPPs rarely win in court."' 5 Even so, they claim that "the
legal system is not effective in controlling SLAPPs"'16 because SLAPP
defendants "are frequently devastated" by the lawsuits,17 leading to a
troublesome chilling effect not only on their own political participation, but
also on that of other citizens who witness the effects of the litigation. 8
To more effectively control SLAPPs, the authors urge a broad
interpretation of the Petition Clause of the First Amendment. 9 As noted
earlier, SLAPPs, by definition, are lawsuits based upon "communications
made to influence a governmental action or outcome ... on ... a
substantive issue of some public interest or social significance."'2
According to the authors, however, every such communication is protected
by the Petition Clause. In particular, the clause "covers any peaceful, legal
attempt to promote or discourage government action at any level (federal,
state, or local) and in any branch (legislative, executive, judicial, and the
electorate)."'" It therefore protects "all means of expressing views to
government," including formal complaints or reports to government
agencies, letters, lobbying, demonstrations, picketing, and boycotts, as long
12. Id. at 30-142.
13. Id. at xi.
14. Id.
15. Id. See also id. at 1 (noting that "the vast majority of such suits fail in court').
16. Id. at xi.
17. Id.
18. Id. at xi-xii.
19. The Petition Clause protects "the right of the people.., to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
20. PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 8-9.
21. Id. at 16 (footnotes omitted).
22. Id.
Number 3]
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LA W JOURNAL
as the expressive activities, in whatever form, are "aimed at producing
government action. 2 3 As a result, the Petition Clause embraces all of the
expressive activities on which SLAPPs might be predicated.
Pring and Canan believe that the Petition Clause should be construed
not only to protect all of these expressive activities, but to protect them
absolutely. Although "sham" petitioning would not be protected, the
authors would extend absolute protection to any genuine attempt to
influence government action. They ground their argument on a broad
reading of the Supreme Court's 1991 decision in an antitrust case, City of
Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc.24 Applying the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine and explaining the doctrine's "sham" exception,25
Omni held that federal antitrust liability cannot be predicated on lobbying
and related activities that are directed toward the adoption or enforcement
of laws, even if those activities are in fact designed to restrict competi-
tion.26 Pring and Canan note that the Court narrowly construed the
doctrine's "sham" exception, limiting its scope to cases "in which 'persons
use the governmental process-as opposed to the outcome of that
process'-as a 'weapon."',
27
Pring and Canan argue that Omni should not be confined to its
particular legal and factual context. Although the Court's holding is framed
in terms of the Sherman Act28 and most of its language suggests that the
opinion is one of statutory interpretation,29 the authors claim that Omni
23. Id. The authors also contend that "even non-petitioning activity deserves protection
if it is an integral part of the overall petitioning effort." Id. at 67.
24. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
25. See Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127 (1961); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965). For a general
discussion of the doctrine, its "sham" exception, and related matters, see STEPHEN F. Ross,
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 524-41 (1993).
26. Omni, 499 U.S. at 380.
27. PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting Omni, 499 U.S. at 380). For a case
exemplifying the "sham" exception and fitting Omni's description of it, see California Motor
Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972) (finding a potential "sham" when
the defendants were alleged to have filed repetitive and frivolous objections to the plaintiffs'
applications for operating authority, not in a genuine attempt to influence the licensing
agencies, but simply to cause the plaintiffs expense and delay).
28. Omni, 499 U.S. at 384.
29. The Court's brief reference to the Petition Clause does include a suggestion that its
ruling "perhaps" would be required by the clause. But the Court's primary argument is that
the clause and its policies provide relevant background for the Court's interpretation of the
federal antitrust laws. The Court's discussion of the Petition Clause reads as follows:
[I]t is obviously peculiar in a democracy, and perhaps in derogation of the
constitutional right "to petition the Government for a redress of grievances," to
establish a category of lawful state action that citizens are not permitted to urge.
Thus, beginning with [Noerr], we have [ruled that the] federal antitrust laws...
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should be read as an interpretation of the Petition Clause. What is more,
they contend that it should be read to provide absolute constitutional
protection not only against antitrust and similar claims of unlawful business
competition or interference, 3' but against all claims that depend upon
communications made by the defendant to influence government action. As
did the Court in Omni, the authors would recognize a narrowly drawn
"sham" exception, but this exception would be largely inconsequential.
Accordingly, they write, "dismissal of a SLAPP should be granted in all
cases except where the [defendant's] activities are 'not genuinely aimed at
procuring favorable government action at all.",'3' For all practical
purposes, then, SLAPP claims would be categorically barred by the Petition
Clause, regardless of their particular legal theory or particular factual
context.
Pring and Canan's reading of Omni is difficult to square with the
context and language of the Court's opinion. Further, as the authors
concede, their proposed extension of Omni is inconsistent with other
Supreme Court precedents. In the context of libel and slander, for example,
the Court has firmly rejected the constitutional absolutism that the authors
find in Omni. Thus, in its 1985 decision in McDonald v. Smith,32 the
Supreme Court ruled unanimously that the Petition Clause does not provide
absolute protection against defamation claims, but instead provides the same
protection that is afforded to expression under the First Amendment's
Speech, Press, and Assembly Clauses.33
Through these various clauses, the First Amendment in fact provides
substantial protection against defamation claims. Not surprisingly, the
greatest protection is available to defendants who criticize public officials
or public figures. Under New York 7mes Co. v. Sullivan34 and its
do not regulate the conduct of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action
from the government This doctrine.., rests ultimately upon a recognition that
the antitrust laws, "tailored as they are for the business world, are not at all
appropriate for application in the political arena."
Id. at 379-80 (citations omitted).
30. Cf. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (holding that the First
Amendment precluded state-law business interference claims against the participants in a
consumer boycott that was designed to secure political and social change).
31. PR NG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 27 (quoting Omni, 499 U.S. at 380) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
32. 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
33. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 22-24. These clauses forbid laws "abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assembly."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
34. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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progeny,35 such defendants are protected even if their criticisms include
demonstrably false and damaging statements, as long as the defendants do
not make these statements "with 'actual malice'--that is, with knowledge
that [they are] false or with reckless disregard of whether [they are] false
or not."36 To recover in this context, moreover, plaintiffs have the burden
of proving the defendants' "actual malice" with "convincing clarity."37
The First Amendment also provides considerable, albeit lesser, protection
to defendants who are sued for making false statements about private
individuals. Thus, at least if they are speaking on matters of public
concern, such defendants cannot be held liable in the absence of fault, and
they cannot be forced to pay presumed or punitive damages absent a
showing of "actual malice." '3  As protective as these standards are,
however, they are not absolute. Defendants who deliberately lie, for
example, even about a public official or public figure, are not protected by
the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court's defamation standards reflect a careful weighing
of competing considerations, including not only the value of free expres-
sion, but also the interest of individuals in protecting their reputations from
the damaging effects of false accusations. In McDonald, the Court
dismissed the notion that this process of constitutional balancing is confined
to claims arising under particular clauses of the First Amendment. Instead,
the Court held that the Speech, Press, Assembly, and Petition Clauses
provide what amounts to a unitary protection for freedom of expression.
In so doing, the Court specifically rejected a claim that the Petition Clause
provides absolute protection even when the other clauses do not. The Court
explained:
To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the
Petition Clause to special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause,
however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that
gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. These First
Amendment rights are inseparable, and there is no sound basis for
granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a
petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions.39
In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan elaborated. "There is no
persuasive reason," he wrote, "for according greater or lesser protection to
expression on matters of public importance depending on whether the
35. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
36. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
37. Id. at 285-86.
38. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
39. McDonald, 472 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted).
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expression consists of speaking to neighbors across the backyard fence,
publishing an editorial in the local newspaper, or sending a letter to the
President of the United States."' O Justice Brennan thus joined the Court's
ruling, agreeing that "expression falling within the scope of the Petition
Clause, while fully protected by the actual-malice standard set forth in New
York 7mes Co. v. Sullivan, is not shielded by an absolute privilege."
41
In light of McDonald's unanimous and resounding rejection of Petition
Clause absolutism, Pring and Canan's constitutional argument, built on the
slender reed of Omni, is one that the Supreme Court almost surely would
reject. Conceding that possibility, the authors suggest that there are ways
to "get around" McDonald.42 State courts, for example, can provide
absolute protection under the petition clauses of their state constitutions,43
and state legislatures can enact laws providing absolute immunity against
SLAPPs" as a matter of statutory rather than constitutional law.45
Pring and Canan contend that non-absolutist approaches, like that of
the Supreme Court in McDonald, force SLAPP defendants into an
unacceptable "fact quagmire." 6  Standards such as "actual malice" are
quite protective of defendants' expressive rights, of course. Thus, as the
40. Id. at 490 (Brennan, J., concurring).
41. Id.
42. See PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 24 & 231 n.67.
43. See id. at 23, 28.
44. The authors' "Model Anti-SLAPP Bill" provides as follows:
Acts in furtherance of the constitutional right to petition, including seeking relief,
influencing action, informing, communicating, and otherwise participating in the
processes of government, shall be immune from civil liability, regardless of intent
or purpose, except where not aimed at procuring any governmental or electoral
action, result, or outcome.
Id. at 203. According to the authors, this provision "spells out the acts or communications
covered with the maximum constitutional breadth under the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in
the Omni case." Id. at 205. The model bill also contains various procedural and penalty
provisions, all designed for the benefit of SLAPP defendants. See id. at 203-04.
A number of states have adopted or considered various forms of anti-SLAPP legislation,
although most such legislation is not as broad or categorical as the authors' model bill. See
id. at 189-201.
45. In a decision that the authors applaud, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island recently
interpreted that state's anti-SLAPP statute to provide SLAPP defendants with absolute
protection (in the absence of "sham" petitioning) even against defamation claims.
Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I. 1996); see Alexandra Dylan Lowe,
The Price of Speaking Out, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1996, at 48, 49-51. The court noted that its
interpretation of the Rhode Island statute was supported by its belief (consistent with that
of Pring and Canan) that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, as a matter of state as well as
federal constitutional law, should not be confined to the particular context in which the
doctrine arose. See Fleming, 680 A.2d at 60-61.
46. See PRIG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 22-24.
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authors acknowledge, SLAPP plaintiffs rarely prevail on their claims.4 7
But such standards nonetheless are fact-sensitive, therefore "making it
extremely difficult for defendants ... to win pretrial dismissal, stop the
chill, and protect their constitutional rights."48
Needless to say, the authors' absolutist stance would protect the
expressive rights of SLAPP defendants. At the same time, however, the
legitimate interests of plaintiffs would be sacrificed altogether. Thus,
plaintiffs would be foreclosed from receiving compensation for their
injuries, no matter how egregious the defendants' misconduct. In particular,
plaintiffs could not vindicate their reputations through defamation lawsuits;
indeed, as long as the defendants were engaged in petitioning activity,
plaintiffs could be libeled and slandered at will. As suggested earlier, the
authors' approach, absolutely barring defamation claims by public officials
and public figures, would go considerably beyond the Supreme Court's
ruling in McDonald. But Pring and Canan actually would take a huge step
further, for they would apply the same approach even to claims by private
citizens who are neither public officials nor public figures. Even in that
context, with private citizens seeking to protect their good names from false
accusations, the defendants' "lying and bad motives" would be beside the
point.49  "[E]ven lies need protection," the authors write, "if we want
'citizen involvement' in our political governance."50
Pring and Canan's diagnosis is sound: SLAPPs chill political
expression in a serious way. The authors' remedy, however, is extremely
difficult to accept, especially when the courts are already rejecting most
SLAPP claims, albeit not through early dismissals.5 If SLAPPs were a
brain tumor, they might call for radical surgery. But they seem to be more
of a headache--to be sure, a very bad headache for SLAPP defendants,52
47. Id. at xi, 1.
48. Id. at 23.
49. Id. at 13.
50. Id. The authors elaborate: "[O]ne of the reasons we argue that misstatements and
even lies should not take away the Petition Clause protection is that once such a case is
allowed to go to trial, it is predictable that a judge or jury will react negatively to such
unappealing actions." Id. at 67.
51. In addition to their absolute immunity proposal, the authors make other suggestions
that are considerably more palatable. For example, they urge defendants not only to seek
judicial sanctions, but to file countersuits ("SLAPPbacks") against plaintiffs who have
brought and pursued frivolous SLAPP lawsuits, and they explain the legal theories on which
such countersuits might be grounded. See id. at 162, 168-87. The authors also provide
other practical advice for SLAPP defendants and their attorneys. See, e.g., id. at 145-67.
52. As the authors observe, defending SLAPPs-ike defending other lawsuits--can be
time-consuming, expensive, and unnerving. "[E]ven if successfully defended," they write,
SLAPPs "can mean enormous expense, lost time, insecurity, risk, fear, and all the other
stresses of extended litigation." Id. at 8.
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and a serious headache for the political system itself. Taking a knife to
plaintiffs' claims would certainly relieve the pain. Yet it would cause even
greater injury, not only to plaintiffs, but to the American system of law and
justice--a system that prides itself not on absolutism, but on the successful
accommodation of competing rights and interests.53
53. Early in their book, Pring and Canan themselves describe the judicial approach that
currently predominates in SLAPP cases, a balancing approach that the authors reject, but that
many would regard as entirely appropriate and desirable:
Citizens' constitutional right to political speech is not absolute; no constitutional
right is. Other citizens also have constitutional rights: to sue, to go to trial, to
have their plans and reputations protected. But neither are those rights absolute.
When two sides each have fundamental constitutional rights, they must be
balanced, must somehow be qualified or limited so that each does not cancel out
the other. Courts strike this balance in the overwhelming majority of SLAPPs
(appropriately, we believe) by finding for the [defendants].
Id. at 11-12.
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